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In this study. we examined uncertainty factors and human 
resource management practices that foster multiskilling of the 
workforce and the effect of multiskilling on labor productivity 
growth of the firm. An empirical analysis of 206 Korean 
manufacturing firms in 22 다lree-digit KSIC's showed the 
following results. First. two uncertainty factors. the product-
demand variability in the industry and the occurrence of 
abnormal situations at the workplace. were positively associated 
with multiskill formation in the sample firms. Second. human 
resource management prac디ces such as mutual leaming among 
coworkers. delegation of authority. and interworkshop mobility 
were positively associated with multiskill formation. Third. the 
degree of multiskill formation was positively associated with the 
firm's labor productivity growth from 1988 to 1993. Fourth. 
uncertainty had an indirect impact on labor producti띠ty growth 
only through muItiskill formation. When both uncertainty and 
multiskilling were included in the regression models. uncertainty 
had no impact on labor producti띠@ 당ro\\πh. Fifth. we found 
growth effect 01‘ multiskilling but no level effect after controlling 
other factors. 
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I. Introduction 
Until the mid-80s , there were two dominant streams of the 
theory of the firm in economics , While the most popular one is 
microeconomic theory that explains a firm as a production 
function , the less popular one is transaction cost economics that 
explains it with the boundary of the firm (Coase 1937; and 
Williamson 1985). More recently , Lucas (1 988) proposed a theory of 
learning that emphasizes the interactions within and between 
human groups in the workplace. To this 찌ew ， people join in a firm 
to learn , and a firm exists to provide its members with a venue for 
learning through interactions. The learning perspective implies that 
the success and gro\\πh of the firm depend 、 on HRM practices that 
stimulate interactions and learning among people. 
In recent management theories , it has been consistently argued 
that human resources contribute to firm ’s sustained competitive 
advantage. According to resource-based view of the firm , firms can 
build sustained competitive advantage by crea디ng value in such a 
way that is rare and difficult for compe디tors to imitate (Barney 
1986 , 1996). 
Although tradi디on머 sources of compe디tive advantage create value 
of the firm such as natural resources , plant facilities , patents. and 
economy of scale , they are usually imitable by the compe디tors. 
tradable through transactions in the market, and mobile from one 
place to another. Contrarily , a 다rm’ s intangible assets such as 
organizational culture and the unique ways of developing and 
m윈laging human resources are strategic assets. Strategic assets 
are difficult to imitable. non-tradable through transactions in the 
market , and immobile from one place to another. Once strategic 
assets are built. they act as core competencies and sustain 
compe디tive advantage over time (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; and 
Barney 1996). 
Based on Collis and Montgomery’s (1 995) work, Becker and 
Gerhart (1996) suggest causal 밍nbiguity and path dependence as 
two key factors that render a firm ’s HRM practices inimitable by 
the competitors. First, causal 없nbiguity refers to the difficulty of 
grasping the precise mechanisms by which the interplay of HRM 
prac디ces and policies creates value. Without comprehensive under-
standing how a certain HRM system work , it is extremely difficult 
for competitors to imitate. Second, HRM prac디ces are path 
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dependent ìn that they are developed over time ìn a unìque way 상O 
competitors cannot purchase them ìn the market. 
According to the scholars ìn strategìc human resource manage-
ment. human resources are not simply an input of production. but 
a factor that constitutes org없lization려 core competencies. Based on 
thìs view. there have been numerous efforts to ìnvestigate 
empirìcally the relationships bejween HRM practices and firm 
performance (cf Arthur 1994: Delery and Doty 1996: Huselid 199!j: 
Huselid .. Jackson. and Schu1er 1997: and Ichniowski et a l. 1997). 
Empìrìcal research ìn strate멍c HHM has shown that various HR:VI 
practices of American firms emphasizìng flexible adaptation to 
changing environments have a posìtive effect on firm performance 
(Becker and Gerhart 1996: Huselid et a l. 1997: and Youndt. Snel l. 
Dean. and Lepak 1996}. These practices include job rotation. small 
groups. self-managing teams. cross-functional teams. multiskilling. 
group incentive systems. skill forrnation. traìnìng and developmen t. 
and par디cipa디ve m밍1agement. 
An ìncreasing number of American firms have recently adopted 
various HRM practices from Japanese firms. In the past. firms ìn 
the two countries established radìcally different HRM systems. 
While Japanese firms operated seniority based HRM systems. 
American counterpaπs operated HRM systems emphasizing 
ìndividual ability and performance. However. firms in both countries 
now seem to exchange merits each other. Japanese finns now try 
to integrate American firms' flexibility into their rigid internal labor 
markets. American firms. on the one hand. selectively adopt certain 
Jap없1ese HRM practices that foster group activitìes and group 
learning. Recognizing that the development of skills and knowledge 
of human resources ìs the key to buìlding core competencies. firms 
ìn both countries have narrowed the gaps ìn HRM practices 
Reflecting the recent development of economic growth models 
based on hum없1 capìtal theory and resource-based view. we 
inves디gate empìrically 야1e rela디onshìps between human capìtal 
accumulatìon through interactions among workers and fìrrn 
performance. Specifically. the purposes of our study are the 
follo뼈ng. First. we investigate the determinants of multiskill 
formation in the workplace. We view multiskilling as an important 
human accumulation mechanìsm ìn the firm that emphasizes 
ìnteractions 없nong people within and between groups. In this 
study. we examine the determinants of multiskill formation in two 
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m멍or areas: environmental unceπainty 밍ld HRM prac디ces. Second. 
we examine whether there is a posi디ve influence of multiskilling on 
firm growth. 
11. The Determinants of Mu1tiski1ling 
A. Variability in Product Demand and Multiskilling 
One of the most important management principles in the U.S. 
firms is specializa디on. Jobs are divided as small as possible so 
that firms easily hire workers from the labor market just like 
people buy the parts of the machine in the market. Firms lay off 
workers any time they become unnecessaIγ. and hire them again 
when they become necessary. 
Although some of the subdivided jobs require a high level of 
knowledge 밍ld skills. m밍lY of them are simple and repetitious 
without requiring such knowledge or skills. In a simple or a highly 
complicated job. one can improve produc디.vity to a certain level by 
the repetition. This is the advantage of division of labor. or 
specialization. Economic development in the United States. until the 
1960s. had been largely indebted to mass produc디on based on 
division of labor or specialization. Firms in the United States 
maximized 야le effects of division of labor by specialization in order 
to mass-produce standardized commodities at the lowest costs 
possible. This is why Taylorism. a scientific management. 윈ld 
Fordism in its concrete realization. were highlighted (Piore and 
Sable 1984). In the economic literature. division of labor has been 
regarded as one of main causes for produc디vity improvement since 
Adam Smith. Becker and Murphy (1 992) recently proposed a 
theoretical model in which division of labor or speCialization is a 
source of economic growth. 
Why. then. did the U.S. firms u디lizing division of labor and 
specialization suffer from difficulties and was challenged by 
Japanese firms in 1980s? First of all. the nature of demands has 
been changed. In these days. people demand diverse commodities 
that reflect their own individualities. As a result. the demands 
become volatile. Every moment new products are introduced and 
new products substitute for existing ones. demands for the existing 
products can decrease drastically. Where jobs are subdivided and 
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job demarcations are strict. firms have certain limitations in coping 
with diverse and volatile market demands immediately. In order to 
cope with rapidly ch없19ing situations. workers are required to be 
multiskilled rather than to be specialized on narrowly defined jobs. 
so that they can perform var10us tasks according to changing 
situations (Aoki 1988). Multiskilling means not only that a worker 
has several skills beyond one skill area but also that he has the 
capability to cope with unusual situations at the workplace (Koike 
1988). 
Changes in demand by the continuous introduction of new 
products bring immediate shocks to the production system. The 
introduction of new products 01' models requires changes in 
manufacturing processes. setups of new production lines. new 
machines. equipment. or tools. and the adjustment of existing lines. 
and creates new tasks. and so on. Since these are usuaUy 
accompanied by unexpected situations such as malfunc디oning of 
machines and equipment. conflicts between processes. and frequent 
changes of machinery and t。이ing. the frequency of unusual 
situation occurrence is expected to increase. 
In order to cope effectively with the above situations. workers 
should be multiskilled to understand overall processes of pro-
duction and to exactly grasp causes of problems and solve them by 
themselves. Relatively speaking, single-skilled workers who are 
specialized on one or two tasks cannot effec디.vely cope with 
exceptional situations 단1at are caused by the introduction of new 
products or models. Copíng with environmental uncertainties. that 
is. frequent and rapid ch없1ges of product demands. needs flexibilìty 
at the workplace. The flexibility requires workers to ha、 e
intellectu따 capabilities to actively perform tasks according 10 
situation ch밍1ges rather than simple skills. Koike (l 988) hence 
calls multiskilling intellectual skills. 
According to Koike’s observations. Japanese workers have wider 
range of skills. less strict job demarcations. can perform more 
various tasks. and hence more frequently solve problems by 
themselves in unusual situations than the U.S. workers. so 삼1εLt 
the flexible production system c밍1 be well-operated in Japan. The 
flexible production system requires workers to solve problems 
frequently without other workers' help. For ex밍nple. operators are 
required to frequently find abnormalities and rep없r or a대ust 
machines and equipment without other technicians' help when their 
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machines and equipment are m려func디oning or need adjustment. 
Koike (1 988) points out as one of Japanese workers' characteristics 
that they are charged not only with normal operations but also 
U끼th unusual tasks. 
An increasing number of American firms have recently introduced 
cross-functional te없ns and cross-training programs to cope with 
fast ch없19ing environments (Robey and Sales 1994). Also. Nemetz 
and Fry (1 988) argued that in order to cope effectively with 
changing customer taste and technology , modem flexible m와lU 
facturing systems require organic structure rather than mechanistic 
structure. In addition. flexible production systems require workers 
to possess knowledge 와ld skills of a broad r밍1ge. To deal with fast 
changing demand and techn이ogy. American workers trained with 
the principle of division of labor are now faced with the need to 
possess broader knowledge and skills. Based on the above 
discussion. the following research hypothesis is presented. 
Hypothesis 1: Vaπability in product demand ωill be positively 
associated with multiskilling. 
B. HRM Practices and Multiskilling 
Multiskill formation is one of the main processes of human 
capital accumulation that broadens workers' skills and knowledge 
to cope with diverse situations. In the economic literature. there are 
two types of human capital accumulation models: the time 
allocation model and 야le leaming-by-doing model. In the former 
time or materials are allocated to invest in human capital instead 
of physical capi때 (Becker 1962; and Ben-Porath 1967) and in the 
latter human capital is accumulated with production on the job 
(Arrow 1962; and Rosen 1972). Both types of models. howcver. 
rarely mention the processes of human capital accumulation or 
skill formation. In an effort to uncover the processes that have 
been left as black boxes. we try to examine what causes 
multiskilling. 
When Becker (1962) 없ld others proposed the concept of human 
capital in 1960s. 야ley emphasized that human capability is 
improved by investment like physical capital. They saw no economic 
difference between improving the students' capability by schooling 
and expanding produc디on capacity by inves디ng in production 
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equipment. Therefore. they thought that the framework of analysis 
for physical capital is also used for human capital. This human 
capital theory has been applied to human behaviors such as 
education. labor market activities. economic growth. fer디lity. and 
addiction. so that there has been big progress in our understanding 
human behaviors. 
Then. tsn ’t there any essential difference between human capital 
investment and physic외 capital investment? Lucas (1 988. p. 19) 
emphasizes that “ human capital accumulation is a social ac디띠ty. 
involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the 
accumulation of physical capital." As an example. citing Jacobs 
(1 984). he suggests the formation and development of cities: people 
get together in cities for such interaction as learning and teaching 
one another in spite of high rents. traffic jam , and other urban 
problems. 
In the similar context. Park (W97b) argues that the interaction 
among workers plays a key role in human capital accumulation on 
the job. and more concretely. suggests a theoretical model in which 
senior workers teach junior workers on the job and this on-the-job 
learning is a source of endogenous growth. 
This argument suggests a new perspective on the nature of tbe 
firm other than Coase’s (193'1) transaction cost perspec디ve. 
Workers get together in the firm to produce output and to learn 
and teach one 없lOther through interaction on the job. The firm 
provides people with a venue for them to accumulate human 
capital by on-the-job interaction and people come together into tbe 
firm in order to increase the vaIue of their human capital through 
on-the-job learning (Park 1997a). 
Interactive teaming and MuttiskiWng: If you accept the view that 
human capital is accumulated by interaction invol띠ng groups of 
people. the firm ’s human resource management prac디ces promoting 
interaction among workers are seen to play an important role in 
multiskill formation as a mechanism of human capi떠1 accumula-
tion. The firm with such human resource management practices 
can be seen to be more adv없ltageous in multiskill th없1 single-sk.i ll 
formation. 
Ban or Jo. which is a basic unit of production with 15-30 
workers , is rarely composed of workers with the same single-skill 
The workshop is composed of workers with different single-sk.ills to 
each other or diverse skills and interactive learning among them 
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necessarily promotes them to accumulate interactively diverse skills 
and knowledge. While specialization is an efficient mode of produc-
tion in a firm that produces existing products , multiskilling is a 
more efficient production mode in a firm where new products are 
con디nuously introduced. The introduction of new products provides 
workers with new leaming opportunities in the process of 
production (Stokey 1988; Young 1991; and Park 1996). 
As the interactive leaming among workers becomes active 뻐th 
the introduction of new products , multiskill rather than single-skill 
formation becomes more active. For single-skill formation the 
interactive leaming works to a certain degree. Once workers' single 
skills advance to a certain level. leaming by themselves plays an 
important role. For multiskill formation , in order to accumulate new 
skills beyond a ceπain level leaming from coworkers or senior 
workers plays a key role. Therefore , interactive leaming 없nong 
coworkers and between senior and junior workers c없1 have a 
posi디ve effect on multiskill formation. 
Job Rotation and Multiskilling: Another prac다ce of human resource 
management 하fecting mul디skilling is job rotation. Koil‘e (1988) sees 
job rotation as the most important practice of human resource 
management for skill formation. While in large U.S. firms workers 
scarcely move to closely related workshops , workers move frequently 
not only within workshops (intraworkshop mobility) but also to 
other workshops (interworkshop mobili낀J in Japanese large firms , 
relative to U.S. workers. Carmichael and Macleod (1 993) also 
describe these Jap잉lese practices 
Intraworkshop and interworkshop mobility are difficult to 
implement in the production system based on specializatíon but 
can be actively implemented in the firm with the frequent 
introductíon of new products. Multiskilling is more progressed in 
the firm with active intraworkshop mobility than the firm without 
it. Multískilling is , however, less progressed with intraworkshop 
mobility than with interworkshop mobility because the former is 
prac디ced among more similar jobs than the latter. Therefore the 
order of the progress of multiskilling is the following: interwork-
shop , intraworkshop mobility , and non-mobility with specialization. 
Recently there have been several research reports that the U.S. 
firms introducing job rotation performed beUer than those who did 
not. That is conceived to be the case because the firm with 
multiskilled human resources c없1 cope with environmental 
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uncertainty more flexibly than otherwise. 
Group lncentives and Multiskilling: Firms with job-based pay systern 
develop specialized human resources. A reward system focusing 00 
individual outcomes may undermine the social foundations needed 
to succeed in a coopera디ve setting. One of the drawbacks of 
job-based pay system is that it cannot elicit cooperation among 
group members when cooperation is required to produce a group 
product (Kelly and Thibault 1969). 외so. job-based pay systern 
makes it difficult to stimulate interactive learning among workers. 
On the other hand. a reward system based on team performance 
may entice cooperation among members of a team. With group pay‘ 
team spirit or team cohesiveness is enhanced and members' skHl s 
and knowledge are improved through interactive learning on the 
job. Kelly and Thibault (1 969) showed in their experiments that 
when individual pay was directly proportional to the quali양 of work 
groups. cooperation and performance of a given group increaseec 
Also. when it is difficult to measure the contribution of an 
individual to group performance‘ or when the nature of the 
technology and workflows become more interwined. group based 
incentives are more effective (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992). 
Summing up the discussion above. group-based incentive system 
may enha.nce group cohesiveness and coopera디on when group 
members are interdependent in performing their tasks. ln addition. 
since a portion of individual pay is dependent on group perfor-
mance. interactions and mutual learning are promoted among 
group members. This incentive scheme creates work environments 
that foster multiskilling. 
Delegation oJ Authority and Multiskilling: Numerous studies have 
shown that participation in decision making processes increases 
produc디vil민 (cf. Black and Lynch 1997: Banker. Field. Schroeder. 
and Sinha 1996: Delery and Doty 1996: Mohrman and Novelli 
1985: and pfeffer 1994). DeleIγ and Doty (1996) identify two 
employment systems: the market type system and internal system. 
Of the two empl아ment systems. internal system is wortJ1 
mentioning. lnternal system is characterized by the existence of an 
internal labor market. It operates HRM practices such as hiring 
mainly früm within the organization. extensive formal training,. 
par디cipative management. and employment security. ln this system. 
employees are viewed as valuable information and are provided a 
great deal of voice. 
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Mohrman and Novelli (1985) showed that workers' participa디on 
in qu려ity circle improved productivity through the increased degree 
of idea generation 없ld implementa디on. Banker and his colleagues 
(1996) reported that 하ter hi힘1 performance work teams were 
formed with higher degree of autonomy. both the qu하ity 와ld labor 
productivity improved over 디me. 
If workers in a team are given authority to decide on qu머ity 
control and work procedures. there will be a hi힘ler degree of 
interactions and thus learning activities among workers. With 
higher discretion. workers can have 없1 increased capability to solve 
problems and cope 뻐th abnormal situations occurring at the 
workplace. πlis process stimulates interactive leaming among 
workers and fosters multiskill formation at fue workplace. Based on 
the above argument. we su잃;est the following research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: H빠，f practices promoting interaction among workers 
(interactive leaming with senior workers/coworkers 
and with junior workers. group incentives. intrawork-
shop and interworkshop mobility. and delegation oJ 
authority) ωill be positively associated with multiskill 
‘ formation. 
111. Multiskilling and the Firm’s Growth 
Multiskilling and the Fírm ’s Groωth: Using the Skill Formation 
Survey data set. Park (1 996) found the role differences between 
multiskilled and single-skilled workers. Multiskilled workers under-
stand the overall production processes beUer and grasp the causes 
of problems more precisely than single-skilled workers. Multiskilled 
workers are more likely to repair or adjust their malfunctioning 
machines or equipments and disassemble and assemble them beUer 
than sin핑e-skilled workers. 
However. wage rates of multiskilled workers are not significantly 
higher than those of single-skilled workers if human capital 
variables such as gender. schooling. expe디ence and firm tenure are 
controlled. Workers' wage rates are neither significantly different 
between workers who can operate machines and equipments and 
those who cannot. These findings indicate an existence of seniority 
wage system (Park 1996). which is a unique feature of the Korean 
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labor markets. It: is likely that workers' wage rates are not 
determined by the characteristics of their individual jobs. 
The introduction of new products or the improvement of exis디ng 
brings shocks to the workplaces. It changes production processes , 
reshuffles production lines , and introduces new tasks. Accordingly , 
many problems in production processes occur such as malfunc-
tioning of machines or equipment, defects , and difficulties in 
coordinating tasks with other processes. Multiskilled workers , who 
understand 。、rerall production processes and deal with malfunc 
tioning problems by themselves better than single-skilled workers. 
handle these situations caused by the production of new products 
or model improvement better thaIl single-skilled workers. 
Multiskill formation bears cost. at the same time. Since 
single-skilled workers continue to perform a job. their productivity 
is expected to increase. This is the producti띠양 improvement 
through the division of labor or specialization pointed out by Adam 
Smith. On the other hand , multi딩killed workers are hardly expected 
to improve their productivity tllrough the division of labor or 
specialization. And this is the opportunity cost associated with 
multiskilll formation. 
With this opportunity cost, maintaining multiskilled workers at a 
certain level is important because , as pointed out above , th，~y 
perform a particular role that sin때e-skilled workers cannot perform 
With new demands occurring more frequently , or with nεw 
products and models introduced more frequently , there is an 
increasing need for a particular role of multiskilled workers. 1\.s 
uncertainty caused by the introd l.lction of new products increases , 
the op디mal ratio of multiskilled workers to total workers increases. 
When a new product is introd l.lced , the average produc디vity of 
workers increases with the ratio of multiskilled workers. And this 
increased productivi양 is transf，εrred to junior workers or next 
period’s workers through on-the-job leaming, so that the 
produc디Vl양 growth increases. Therefore , as the multiskilled 
workers' ratio increases , the expected growth of produc디vity 
increases. Based on the observations and discussions above , we 
can set up the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3-a: Multiskilling will be positively associated with labor 
productivi，뱅 growth. 
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Unceπainty and the F'inn ’s Growth: Unceπainty in product dernand 
caused by the introduction of new products basically provides the 
firrn with an opportunity for productivity growth. However ‘ if the 
firrn does not have hurnan resources that can prornptly cope with 
the environrnental unceπainty. it hardly attains firrn growth. 
n없nely. productivity growth. The firrn that trains workers to be 
rnultiskilled is able to fully utilize the leaming opportunity 
occurring frorn the introduction of new products. Higher leaming 
capability leads to higher produc디vity. On the other hand. ìn spìte 
of the opportunity for gro\\πh. if the firrn is not prepared to utilize 
the leaming opportuni양 with rnultiskilled labor. it cannot tum this 
opportuni양 into growth. Therefore. we can set up the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3-b: 깐tefinn’s unceπainty (sales variations by products. 
sales portion variations. and Jrequency oJ unusual 
situation occurrence) does not have a direct associ-
ation with its labor productivity growth. 
Multiskilling and Labor Productivi띠 Level: Mul디sk1lling affects the 
growth but does not directly affect the level of labor producti띠ty. 
The argurnent that the level and growth effects are different (Lucas 
1988) can be justified by the following. If all firrns have the sarne 
initial level of productivity. the effect of rnultiskilling on growth is 
transrnitted as it is on level. so that the two effects can be 
observed identic머ly. However. the assurnption that all firrns have 
the s밍ne initial level of productivity is unrealistic and the two 
effects are hence to be separated. Neither anyone can tell that a 
firrn with a lower level of producti띠ty grows slowly. nor a firrn ’s 
higher level of produc디띠ty cannot guar없ltee the fast growth of its 
labor produc디띠ty. Therefore. the firrn ’s rnultiskilling a[fects its 
gro\\πh but does not have a direct relationship with its level of 
labor productivity. 
Hypothesis 3-c: Multiskilling ωill not have a signifìcant positive 
association ω다h the level oJ labor productivity. 
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IV. Data and Measurement of the Variables 
A. Data 
ln our study. we used the data on multiskilIing and HRM 
practices from the Skill Fonnation Survey conducted by 삽le Korea 
Labor lnstitute in 1992. 깐le sampling procedure in Skill Fonnation 
Surveν is the foIlowing. Out of 5.276 firms listed in Financial 
Repoπ of Korean Firms 1991 (Korean Investors Service 1992). 4~)0 
firms were selected by 납le stratified random s와npling procedure 
according to region 밍ld firm size. Then. ques디onnaires were sent to 
these firms by mail. Out of 306 ques디onnaires that were returned 
(68% response rate). 206 were us당d for our empiric외 analyses. 100 
firms were dropped from our analyses due to the missing records. 
There were two types of Skill Fonnation Surveν. One was a 
Suπeμ for Employer that contained survey items regarding HRM 
prac디ces of a firm. A firm ’s HRM manager filled out this suπey. 
The other was a Survey for Employee that contained survey items 
regarding individuals’ skilI formation. In order to suπey the 
individuall workers. the HRM manager was asked to select either 1 
production line for a medium sized firm with less than 500 
employees. or 2 production lines for a large firm with more thεn 
500 employees. These lines were to represent the most typical 
production lines of the firm. For each selected production line. the 
HRM manager was then asked to randomly select 7-10 workers for 
a medium sized firm. and 10-15 workers for a large firm. to 
respond to the survey. After excluding the missing cases. the total 
number ()f employees was 2.220. The average number of workers 
who responded to the survey in the sample firms was 10.2. The 
total nurnber of employees used in our analyses was 2.220. 
B. Meas l..lrement oJ the Variables 
a) Measurement of the Control Variables 
Industry concentration ratio. sales. tangible fixed asset per 
employee. tangible fixed asset Growth. union. workers' avera당e 
tenure. workers’ average education. and characteristics of the 
machines were used for the control variables. 
Concentr，αtion Ratio (CR3): Industry concentration ratio was 
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calculated from the KDI (Korea Development Institute) CR3 data. 1 
KDI’s CR3 data contained the value of shipments of the largest 
three firms and of industry in 4-digit KSIC (Korean Standard 
Industry Code) in 1989. Since our sample firms were classified in 
3-digit KSIC. the wei힘lted average of CR3 on the value of 
shipments was calculated at 3-di횡t KSIC. KDI CR3 data in 1989 
were the most current one. Concentration ratio was used in our 
analyses to control for the possible differences in skill formation 
mechanism between monopolistic and non-monop이istic industries 
(Nam 1994). 
Sales: Sales was used to control for the effects of scale economy on 
firm performance. To correct the skewness. log sales in million 
wons was used in the an외yses. Data were drawn from Financial 
Report of Korean Firms in each year published by Korean Investors 
Service. 
Tangible Fixed Asset per Employee: Tan명.ble flxed asset per 
employee was calculated as the total fixed asset in million wons 
divided by the total number of employees at the yearend of 1992. 
Then. the log was taken to remedy the skewness. Data were drawn 
from Financial Report of Korean Firms. Tangible fixed asset per 
employee was used to control for the effects of investment in 
automation or advanced production facilities on the level of labor 
productivi양. This variable was included in the analyses of the 
determinants of mul디skilling ratio and the labor productivi양 level 
Tangible Fixed Asset GrOlνth Rate: Tangible fixed asset growth rate 
was calculated as the 6-year average gro、짜h rate of tangible flxed 
asset per employee during 1987 and 1993. This variable is used to 
control for the effects of additional investment in machines and 
tools on the gro\\πh of labor productivity 
Union: Union as a dummy variable was included in our analyses to 
control for the effect of union on firm performance. The variable 
was measured by one item in Survey for Emploνer and coded 1 if a 
union exists in a firm. and 0 otherwise. Unions may resist 
rearrangements of human resources or the adoption of new HRM 
practices (Black and Lynch 1997). Hence it is expected to have a 
nega디ve inf1uence of union on firm performance. 
Workers' Average Tenure: Workers' average tenure in the firm was 
calculated from an item in Suπey for Emploυer. Average tenure was 
lWe obtained the CR3 data with the heJp of Dr. Seung-Min Yu at KDI. 
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measured as workers' average number of years of service in the 
firm. and used to control for the effects of tenure on the level and 
the growth of labor producti띠ty. 
Workers' Average Education: Workers' average education was 
calculated from an item in Surv뱅 Jor Employer. Workers' average 
education was measured as workers' average number of years in 
school. This measure was used to control for the effects of 
schoolin당 on 삼le level 없1d the gro"\\밤1 of labor productivity. 
Characteristics oJ Machines and T'ools: Four categories of machines 
and too1s were used to control their possible impact on skill 
formation according to Amber and Amber (1 962): (1) manual to01s: 
(2) power-d디ven tools: (3) semiautomatic machines: and (4) automaUc 
machinei‘. Data were constructed from the Survey Jor Emploνee and 
calculated as the ratio of workers in a given firm who checked 
each categmγ. The r밍1ge of these variables is from 0 to 1. 
b) Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 
Level oJ Labor Productivi띠: The measurement of the level of labor 
produc디νity was based on the value-added per employee in 
Financial Report oJ Korean Fimls. Value-added per employee is 
measurecl by the totaI value-added over the total number of 
employees in a given firm. Thenπ’ 삼the level of labor proαduc따t디i띠ty pe 
employee was caIculated as the average labor productivity over 3 
years between 1990 and 1993. All vaIue-added measures were 
expressecl in 1990 wons using thc:‘ CPI (Consumer Price Inclex) as a 
deflator. 
Labor Productivity Growth: Labor productivity growth was calculated 
as the 6-year average growth rate of labor procluctivity per 
employee during 1987 and 1993. 
Multiskilling Ratio: Mul다skilling Ratio was calculated based on 
Survey Jor Employee. The suπey asked the workers to check one of 
the 7 skJllls categories they belonged to: (1) simple manual worker; 
(2) trainee; (3) single-skilled worker; (4) high quality single-skillecl 
worker: (5) multiskilled worker: (6) high quality multiskilled worker: 
ancl (7) technicaI multiskilled worker. Among these. some categories 
neecl further explanation. Single skilled worker (category 3) is 
clefined as a worker who owns skills in a narrowly defined area.. 
High-quality single skilled worker (category 4) is a worker who 
owns high-quality skills 밍nong the single skilled workers. 
Multiskilled worker (category 5) is one who owns skills in at least 
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two areas. High-qu외ity multks따lled worker (category 6) is one who 
has high-qu외ity skills in at least two areas. Lastly. technical 
multiskilled worker (category 7) is one who not only owns skills in 
various areas but also has theoretical knowledge and ability to 
judge comprehensively. 
In this study. multiskilled workers were measured as those who 
checked category 5. 6. or 7. Multiskilling ra디o was then calculated 
as the total number of multiskilled workers over the total number 
of workers who responded to the survey. 
Demand Variability: Two measures of demand unceπain양 were 
used in the analyses: sales variation and sales proportion variation 
at the industry level. The measures of demand variability were 
computed using the sales data of 3 major ‘ product groups of 467 
listed companies du디ng 1988-92. These data were obtained from 
Financial Report oJ Korean Firms. The measurement process was 
the following. First. the ratio of sales change in each product was 
computed each year. The formula is given by [(SALiJ 一 SALiJ -d/
SALij -l: SAL=sales of each product. i=따1 product. j = jth year) ] . 
Second. standard deviation of sales ch밍1ge of each product for 4 
years was computed. Third. the average of standard deviation 
weighted by each sales volume was computed. A maximum number 
of 6 products were used for each company since. in some firms. 
the list of top 3 product changed in some year. Fourth. the mean 
of standard deviation of sales change of each firm was then 
averaged at the 3-digit KSIC. 
Sales propor디on variation was measured in the following 
procedure. First. sales ratio of each major product was computed 
as the sales of each major product over the total sales. Second. the 
absolute value of the difference is computed between the sales ratio 
of each product in the current year and that in the past year. and 
then 1 was added. The absolute value was taken because both the 
increase and the decrease of sales proportion increases demand 
uncertainty. Then the value of 1 was added to reflect the increase 
in uncertainty in the current year relative to the past year. If there 
is no change in sales proportion of each product. this value 
becomes 1. Fourth. to capture the sales ratio change of up to six 
major products. all the values obtained in the third stage were 
multiplied. Fifth. the 4-year (1 989-92) average of the value obtained 
in the fourth stage was then calculated. The formula is given by 
[n iJ(1+ IPiJ -P;J-11): P=sales ratio of each product. i= 따1 product. 
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j=jth year]. Sixth. the sales proportion variation obtained in the 
fif1삼1 stag안 was then averaged at the 3-digit KSIC. 
Occuπence OJ Abnonnal Situations: The occurrence of abnormal 
situations was measured as the two items from Suroey Jor 
Employee. The workers were asked to indicate (1) whether they 
encounter abnormal situations and (2) whether they deal with new 
tasks on the job. 까le proportion of the workers who responded 1:0 
each item posi디vely was computed and then the two measures 
were averaged. 
In add:ition to the uncertainty from extemal environments. the 
intemal sources of unceπainty within the firm may also affect t1le 
degree of multiskill formation. Tbe inclusion of the occurrence ’)f 
abnormal situations in our study was to test Koike’s (1988) 
argument that mul디skilling is fostered at the workplace where 
abnormal situations frequently occur. 
Interactive Leaming ωith Senior Workers/Coworkers: Interactive 
learning with senior workers and coworkers was measured using 
the two items in Suroey Jor Employee. Workers were asked to 
indicate (1) whether they leam on the job from senior workers and 
coworkers and (2) whether they teacb their senior workers and 
coworkers on the job. The proportion of the number of workers 
who responded to each question posi디vely was computed 없ld then 
the nνo measures were averaged. 
Interactive Leaming with Junior Workers: lnteractive leaming with 
junior workers and coworkers was measured using the two items in 
Suπey Jor Employee. Workers were asked to indicate (1) whether 
they leam on the Job from junior workers and (2) whether they 
teach their junior workers on the Job. The proportion of the 
number of workers who responded to each ques디on positively was 
computed 없ld the two measures vvere averaged. 
Decision Making Authoπtν (Team): Decision making authority at the 
team level was constructed from 3 questions in Survey Jor 
Employee asking to check on a Likert 5-point scale the degree of 
autonomy 탱ven to the team in deciding 감le qu따1디.ty. the speed. 
and the method of work (Crombach-a=O.87). 
Decision Making Authority (1ndividual): Decision making au삼lOrity at 
the in버띠du떠 level was constructed from 3 questions in Suπey Jor 
Employee asking to check on a Likert 5-point scale the degree of 
autonomy given to the individual in deciding the quan디ty. the 
speed. and the method of work (Crombach-a=O.91). 
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Group Incentive: Group incentive was measured as a dummy and 
was coded 1 if a portion of worker's pay was determined by group 
performance, 0 otherwise. 
Intraworkshop Mobilitν: The measure of intraworkshop mobility was 
from an item in Survey Jor Emploμer. Intraworkshop mobility was 
measured as a dummy and was coded 1 if a firm rotates workers 
within workshop , 0 otherwise. 
Interworkshop Mobility: The measure of interworkshop mobility was 
from an item in Suπey Jor Employer. Interworkshop mobility was 
measured as a dummy 밍1d was coded 1 if a firm rotates workers 
between workshops , 0 otherwise. 
v. Results 
Table 1 presents the me없lS ， standard deviations , correlations of 
the study variables. In order to test a series of hypotheses. we 
conducted regression 밍1려yses. Table 2 displays the results of 
regression analyses for the determinants of multiskilling. Sales 
variation as a measure for demand variabili양， the occurrence of 
abnormal situations , and various HRM prac디ces are included in the 
analyses. 
Table 3 displays the results of regression analyses for the 
determinants of multiskilling. Sales propoπion variation as another 
measure for demand variability, occurrence of abriormal situations , 
and various HRM practices are included in the ana1yses. Two 
measures of dem밍1d va디ability. i. e.. sales variation 밍1d sales 
proportion variation, are 윈1머yzed in different regressions because 
of a hi방1 mul디collinearity between them (r=O.60). In order to test 
further whether there are mul디collinearity problems 없nong 
variables in the ana1yses. VIFs (variance inf1ating factors) are 
calculated. Since a l1 values of VIFs are less than 2. there seems to 
be no mul디collinearity problem in the analyses. 
Table 4 presents the results of regression analyses to test the 
rela디onship between multiskilling and labor productivity gro~πh. 
Lastly. Table 5 displays the results of regression analyses testing 
the relationship between multiskilling and the level of labor 
productivity. 
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11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 5.D. Me킹1 Variables 
0.11 0 .08 1. Labor Producti에ty Growth 
0.14 11.66 23.95 2. Level of Labor Producti에ty (MM Wons) 
0.12 0.20 0.22 0 .50 3. Multiski피ng Ratio 
0. 19 0.11 0 .09 0.02 0.08 4. Sales Variation 
0.60 0.18 0.03 -0.08 0 .04 1. 16 5. Sales Proportlon VaIiation 
0.12 0.11 0.29 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.18 6. Occurrence of Abnormal 5ituations 
0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.38 0 .18 1.43 10.58 7. Sales (Log MM Won) 
8. T:와1명ble Fixed Asset per Employee 
ιog MM Wons) 
0 .42 0.07 0.12 -0.01 -0. 14 0.61 0.04 0.79 3 .21 
0.26 0 .02 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.21 0.15 0 .1 1 9. Growth of T:윈1핑ble Fixed Asset/Employee 
0.20 -0.11 0 .33 0.00 0.12 -0.09 -0.02 0.23 0.19 -0 .06 0 .55 10. Industry Concentration Ratio (CR3) 
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0.11 0.06 0 .00 0.26 0.37 0.06 0.06 -0 .12 -0.05 0.28 0.05 0 .46 0 .30 13. Power-drtven Tool 
0.05 0 .00 0 .10 0 .01 -0.04 0 .01 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0 . 15 -0.04 -0.07 0 . 16 14. Semiau tomatic Machine 
0.20 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.27 0 .05 0 .02 0.12 0.17 0.02 0 .16 0 .13 15. Automatic Machine 
0 . 19 0 .12 0 .07 0 .31 0.34 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.33 0.28 0.11 2 .83 5 .51 16. Workers' Average Tenure 
0 .01 0.22 0 .01 -0 .04 0.06 0.22 0 .02 0 .16 -0.11 0.10 0.72 -0.06 11.91 17. Workers' Average Education 
18. Interact1ve 냥따ning with Seniors/ 
Coworkers 
0 .03 0 .08 0 .06 0.08 0.06 0.14 0 .07 0.19 -0.05 0.00 0 .01 0.08 0 .94 
0 .02 0 .10 0.12 0.27 0 .14 0.24 0 .06 0 .06 0.33 0.14 0 .08 0 . 14 0 .69 19. Interactive Learning with Junior Workers 
0.14 -0.04 0 .01 0 .10 0.27 -0.03 0 .04 0.01 0.28 0.06 0 . 13 -0 .01 0 .40 20. Decision M와따19 Authority rre없띠 
0 .09 -0.01 0 .01 0.13 0 .21 -0.01 0 .06 0 .04 0.33 0.06 0 . 13 -0.04 0 .35 21. Decision M와따19 Authority On띠애du외) 
0 .12 -0.04 0.16 0.07 0 .11 -0.04 0 .18 -0 .02 -0 .01 0.04 0.04 0 .29 0 .09 22. Group lncentive (D) 
0.02 0 .07 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0 .11 -0. 11 -0. 10 -0.17 0 .50 -0.08 0 .44 23. lntraworkshop Mobility (D) 
0.03 
ITable Continued) 
0.01 0. 19 0 .07 0. 11 0 .16 0 .14 0 . 17 0 .21 0.06 0.06 0.45 0 .28 24. Interworkshop Mobility (D) 






































-0.93 13. Power-driven Tool 
0.01 -0.01 14. Semiautomatic Machine 
-0.15 0.19 .0.17 15. Automatic Mach1ne 
-0.05 0.09 0.11 -0.09 16. Workers' Average Tenure 
-0 .20 0 .32 0 .00 0 .00 0 .03 17. Workers' Average Education 
18. Interactive 1ιea.ming with Seniors/ 
Coworkers 
0 .28 -0.07 0 .07 0 .03 0 .09 -0 .08 
0 .49 0.09 0.21 0 .03 0.00 0 .10 -0 . 16 19. Interactive 1ιea.ming with Junior Workers 
0 .31 0 .12 0.09 0 . 18 0.05 0.16 -0.02 0.02 20. Oecision M와òng Authority (Team) 
0 .75 0 .31 0 .14 0.09 0.20 0 .10 0.16 .0.05 0 .05 21 . Decision Ma퍼ng Authority (lndividuaJ) 
0.20 0.21 0 .22 0 .06 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.08 -0 .06 22. Group Incentive (D) 
-0.01 .0 .02 .0 . 10 -0.06 0.00 0.06 -0 .10 0.00 .0.08 0 . 11 -0 .13 23. Intraworkshop Mobility (D) 
K* ( -‘‘ 
-0.55 0 .03 0 . 17 0 .18 0 .06 
Notes: p < 0.05 if correlations are greater than 0 .14; p ., 0.01 if correlations are greater than 0 . 18. 

































































































T킹1핑ble Fixed Asset 
(Log MM Wons) 










































































































































































































































Interactive Learning with 
Seniors I Coworkers 
0 .366-
(0.105) 












Group Incentive (0) 
-0.008 
(0.029) 


































































































































T없1명ble Fixed Asset 
(Log MM Wons) 



































































































































































































































Occurrence of Abnormal 
Situations 
0 .386** 
(0. 17 1) 
Interactive Learning wi야1 
Seniors / Coworkers 
0.360빼 
(0.106) 












Group lncentive 때 
-0 .006 
(0.029) 


























lnterworkshop Mobility (D) 
R-Squ따e 
F-value 
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A. Demand Variability and Multiskilling (Hypothesis 1) 
In Table 2 and Table 3. 야le results of regression analyses to test 
Hypothesis 1 없ld 2 are presented. Model (1) in Table 2 and Table 
3 included only the control variables to estimate multiskilling. More 
specifically. model (1) of Table 2 shows that firms with unions slow 
야le multiskill formation (p<0.05). This result is consistent with 
Black and Lynch’s (1997) empiric허 fm띠ng that the existence of 
union negatively 따fects labor produc디찌양. In model (1). workers' 
average tenure was posi디vely associated with mul디skilling (p< 0.01). 
This result shows that multiskilling is progressed with workers' 
longevity of service with the firm. Also. workers' average education 
was posi디vely associated with multiskilling (p <0.01). On the other 
hand. sales. tangible fixed asset per employee. and characteristics 
of machines and tools were not significant. Model (1) in Table 3 
shows the similar results as in Table 2. Model (2) in Table 2 
includes control variables 없ld two major independent variables: 
sales variation and the occurrence of abnormal situations. These 
two independent variables show significant posi디ve associations 
with mul디skilling ψ<0.01). Model (2) in Table 3 shows that both 
sales propor디on variation and the occurrence of abnormal situations 
have significantly posi디ve coefficients (p < 0.01). These results show 
that all three measures of demand uncertainty (2 measures of 
demand variability and one measure of the occurrence of abnormal 
situations) were significantly positively associated with multiskill 
formation. Therefore. Hypothesis 1 that “variabili얀 in product 
demand will be posi디vely associated with multiskilling" is supported. 
B. HRM Practices and Multiskilling (Hypothesis 2) 
Model (3) - (9) in Table 2 and Table 3 present the results of 
regression analyses testing the relationship between various HRM 
prac디ces and multiskilling. Model (3) 없ld (4) in Table 2 and Table 
3 show that both interactive learning with senior workers/ 
coworkers 없ld with junior workers are significantly positively 
associated with mul디skilling (p <0.01). This result indicates that 
multiskilling is fostered by ac디ve mutual learning among workers. 
In model (5) and (6) in Table 2 and Table 3. it is shown that 
decision making authority at the team level (p <0.05) and at the 
individual level (p<O.Ol) are both important in fostering 
multiskilling. The delegation of decision authority to workers at the 
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workplace is deemed crucial in multiskill formation. In model (7) in 
Table 2 and Table 3. group incentive is not significantly positively 
associated with mul디skilling (P=" n.s.). It seems likely that since 
only a few firms. 9% of the sample fírms. adopt group incentives. 
there is not enough variance of the variable to test the effects 
In model (8) in Table 2 하ld Table 3. intraworkshop mobility is 
not signiJicantly associated with multiskill formation. The insignifi-
cance of intraworkshop mobility indicates that the sample fírms do 
not provide enough opportunity for workers to leam diverse tasks 
by moving wi안1in a workshop. On the contrary. model (9) in Table 
2 and Table 3 shows that interworkshop mobility is significantly 
positively associated with multiskill formation (p <0.05). This result 
is consistent with Koike’s (1988) observation that job rotation 
across workshop fosters mul디skilling in Japanese firms. 
Hypothesis 2 that “HRM practices promo디ng interaction among 
workers (interactive leaming with senior workersl coworkers and 
with junior workers. group incentives. intraworkshop mobility. inter-
workshop mobility , 밍ld delegation of decision making authority) will 
be positively associated with multiskill forma디on" is supported in 
the analyses except in the case of group incentives and 
intraworkshop mobiliψ. 
C. Multiskílling and Firm Growth (Hypothesis 3-a, 3-b. 3-c) 
Table <1 and Table 5 present the results of regression 없lalyses 
testing hypothesis 3-a, 3-b. and 3-c. Model (1) in Table 4 shows 
the relationship between the control variables and labor produc디.vity 
gro\\πh. Among the control variables. sales (p<0.05) and tangible 
fixed asset per ernployee ψ<0.01) are signific하1tly positively 
associated with labor productivi양 growth. πle significance of sales 
is 하1 interesting result that traditional economics cannot easi1y 
explain. One possible explanation would be that interactions among 
people increase with the size of the firm (Lucas 1988; Backus. Kehoe , 
and Kehoe 1992; and Grossman and Helpman 1994). Concentration 
ratio (CR:3) is not significant but the si땅1 was negative as expected 
Although not significant.. it shows that labor productivity growth is 
slower in monopolistic industries than in more competitive 
industries. In addition. union. workers’ average tenure and workers' 
average education are not significantly associated with labor 
productiv.ity growth ψ =n.s.). 
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TA와.E 4 
MULTlS없LLING AND L뼈OR PRODUCTIVl'IY GROwrH (N = 206) 
Var1ables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.001 0 .047 0.032 0.159 
(0.123) (0.121) (0.128) (0.255) 
Control Variables 
Industry Concentration Ratio -0 .050 -0 .057 -0.056 -0 .057 
(CR3) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Sales (1ρg MM Won) 0 .013** 0.014** 0 .013** 0 .014** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
T없1명ble Fixed Asset Growth 0.127- 0.125- 0.125- 0 .122*** 
(Per Employee) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Union (D) 0 .008 0.014 0.014 0 .015 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Workers' Average Tenure 0.001 -0.002 -0 .002 -0 .002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Workers' Average Education -0.004 -0 .0 18 -0.011 0.014 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Independent Varlables 
Mul디skil파19 Ratio 0 .102*** 0.093- 0.098빼 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Sales (MM Won) 0.101 
(0.325) 
Sales Ratio Variation of Major -0.085 
Products (0.192) 
Occurrence of Abnonnal 0 .033 0.035 
Situations (0.034) (0.043) 
R-Square 0 .08 0 .13 0.13 0.13 
F-value 3.11 *** 4.23*** 3.35- 3 .36*** 
Note: *p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. 찌*p < 0 .01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Model (2) in Table 4 shows that mul디S퍼lling is signiftcantly 
positively associated with labor producti띠ty growth ψ < 0.01). 
Therefore. the hyp빠lesis 3-a that “mul섬S없뻐19 will be positively 
associated with labor producti띠ty growth" is supported. 
Model (3) and (4) in Table 4 show that unceπainty. extema1 and 
internal. is not significantly associated with labor productlvi양 
growth when mul디S퍼피ng is included in the regression equations ψ 
= n.s.) . This result indicates that unceπainty influences labor 
productivity growth only through multiskill formation. That is. there 
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TABLE 5 
MULTISK1LLlNG AND LEVEL OF LABOR PRODuCTIVI1Y (N= 206) 
Varia bles (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -256.92. . -256.92.. -358.82- -243.13 
(1 17.95) (I 17.80) (124.38) (251.91) 
Control Variablcs 
Indust ry Concentration RatIo 36.33 36 .33 42.75 35.38 
(CR3) (36.09) (36 .09) (35.93) (36.35) 
Sales (Log MM Won) 10.38. 10.38. 9.40. 10.39. 
(5.51) (5.51) (5.47) (5.59) 
T밍19ible Fixed Asset Growth 75.32- 75.32". 76.12 ••• 75.41 ••• 
(Per Employee) (9.12) (9. 12) (9.05) (9.33) 
Union (0) -17.62 -17.62 -17.96 -17.82 
(1 4 .82) (1 4.82) (1 4.69) (1 4.92) 
Workers ' Average Tenure 5.22. 5. 11 . 5.59 •• 5.04. 
(2.70) (2.70) (2.68) (2.73) 
Workers' Average EducatIon 9 .45 9 .45 13.88 10.05 
(9.60) (9 .60) (9.79) (9.82) 
Independent Variables 
Mul디ski]ling Ratio -6 .65 -19.63 -3.00 
(3 1. 13) (32.59) (33.02) 
Sales (MM Won) 737.24 
(509.89) 
Sales Ratio Variation of MaJor -16.83 
Products (190.11) 
Occurrence of Abnormal -23.07 -14.83 
Sit ua tions (40.71) (4 1.31) 
R-Square 0 .41 0.41 0 .42 0 .41 
F-value 23.16." 19.77- 14.35." 15.24." 
Note: . p < 0. 10. ·엉<0 .05 .•• φ<0.0 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
is no d irect effect of unceπ머n양 on labor productivity growth 
without the mediating effect of mul디skilling. Therefore. th.e 
hypothesis 3 -b that “ the firm’s uncertainty (sales variations. sales 
propor디on variations. and frequency of unusual situation 
occurrence) does not have a direct relationship with its labor 
productivity growth" 1s supported. 
Model (1) - (4) in Table 5 test the relationship between 
multis힘lling 킹ld the level of labor producti여ty. In 와ly of th.e 
models. there is no significant assoc1ation between mul디skilling an d 
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labor producti띠양 (n二 n.s.). Therefore. the hypothesis 3-c that 
"multiskilling will not have a significant posi디ve association with 
the level of labor producti띠ty" is supported. 2 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our empiric외 study contributes to the literature of labor ec-
onomics and human resource management in the following manner. 
First. we examined the determinants of multiskilling for a key 
mechanism of human capital accumulation. It was shown that two 
unceπainty factors. the product-demand variability in the industry 
and the occurrence of abnormal situations' at the workplace. were 
positively associated with multiskill formation in the sample firms. 
The theoretical relationship between uncertainty and multiskill 
formation proposed by Aoki (1 988) and modeled by Park (1 996) was 
empirically confirmed in this study. 
Second. various human resource management prac디ces employed 
by the fírm were shown to affect multiskill formation of the 
workforce. Interactive leaming with senior workers/coworkers and 
with junior workers. delega디on of decision making authority to the 
production teams. and interworkshop mobility were posi디vely 
associated with multiskilling. Except in the case of group incentive 
and intraworkshop mobility. all of the HRM practice variables in 
this study showed posi디ve relationships with mul디skilling. This 
result indicates that the firm should establish effective HRM 
prac디ces to foster multiskilled workforce as a firm ’s core 
competencies to cope with environmental uncertainty characterized 
by demand and technolo잉r change (Becker and Gerhart 1996: 
Pfeffer 1994: and Youndt et a l. 1996). Also the results of our study 
imply that multiskill formation is influenced by the development of 
2We also conducted additional regression analyses to investigate the 
possible relationships between multiskilling and firm performance. We used 
ROA (retum of assets) 킹ld ROS (return on sales) as the measures of 
dependent variable. firm perform밍lce. We obtained very similar results as in 
Table 5. Neither of multiskilling or unceπainty was significantly posi디vely 
associated with two measures of firm performance. 
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internal labor markets. We can rnake this argument based on our 
fin띠ng that time for skill formation measured by workers' average 
tenure was important in promoting mulUskilling. Therefore. human 
capital is accumulated more effectively in internal labor markets 
than extemal labor markets. 
Third. uncer떠inty had an indirect impact on labor productivity 
growth only through multiskill formation. When both uncertainty 
and mul디skilling were included in the regression modei.s. 
uncertainty had no impact on labor productivity growth. This result 
suggests that labor productivity is enhanced only when firms 
successfully respond to uncertainty with multiskilled workforce. 
Fourth. the degree of mul디skilling was not significantly associ 
ated with the level of labor productivity. We found growth effect of 
multiskilling but no level effect after contr이ling other factors. This 
result indicates that the firm with highly multiskilled workforce has 
the poten디al to grow although the current productivity of its 
workers is low. 
Fifth. our study tried to overcorne the limitations of generalization 
of the exis디ng empiric외 works. While existing works on HRM 
prac디ces concentrated one or two industries. we examined 206 
firms in 22 industries (in 3-digit KSICs). We discovered empirically 
the causal connections between u l1certainty. mul디skilling. and labor 
productivity growth over a wide range of industries. 
We suggest the following future research directions. First. as 
mentioned above. rnore thorough analyses of the processes throu딩h 
which the characteristics of internal labor market affect humε n 
capital accumulation. It can be said that U.S. firms have different 
ways of coping with environmental uncertainty than Japanese 
firms. If the differences in coping exist. they should be sought .. n 
the differences of the internal labor markets of the firms in both 
countries. One important task is to uncover the contingencies 
under which HRM prac디ces of U .S. firms perform beUer than those 
of Japanese firms. or vise versa. 
Second. another research strearn is to classity the type of a 
firm ’s HRM practices and examine its (‘ ffects on perforrnance. In 
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our study. we dealt with HRM prac디ces and multiskilling 
separately. However. the current studies investiga디ng HRM prac디ces 
tend to take configura디on외 approach (Ichniowski et a l. 1997; 
Huselid 1995; Husedlid et a l. 1997; Kandel and Lazear 1993; and 
Milgrom and Roberts. 1995). In par디cular. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1 995) argued that the bundle of HRM practices have greater effects 
than the individual prac디ces. They called this effect as the 
complementarity of a firm ’s HRM practices. More thorough analyses 
are needed to test whether individual or complementarity effect is 
greater 
Third ‘ future research needs to look at the congruence between 
management strategy and HRM prac디ces (Huselid 1995; Delerγ and 
Doty 1995; and Youndt et a l. 1996). Congruence perspective is 
based on the contingency theoI}' in management (Dewar and 
Werbel 1979; 없ld Van de Ven 없ld Drazin 1985). According to 
DeleI}' and Doty (1995). if HRM systems are aligned with 
management strategy. firm performance improves. But if HRM 
systems are not congruent with management strategy. firm 
performance deteriorates. 50 far. empirical research inves디ga디ng 
what constitutes the congruence and what part of the congruence 
drives performance has been rare. Further theoI}' building and 
empirical examination in this topical area is needed 
(Received 2 October 2003: Revised 1 May 2004) 
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